Unmanaged is not down
A host whose agents have wedged still runs its guests. Rebooting it to fix a console problem takes an outage nobody needed; restarting the agents does not.
Nobody can manage anything. A host has dropped out of the console with its guests still running, a certificate is days from lapsing, a clock is fifteen minutes out and the appliance stops its own services. Repair the management plane in the right order and prove it.
Mission brief · V-550
the break-glass IR account `svc-ir`, checked out of the vault for this incident — never the compromised identity
The detection fired in the EDR console. You opened a live-response session from that detection, so your shell rides the EDR agent channel — containing the host will *not* cut you off, which is exactly why you contain from here rather than over SSH.
EDR console (detections + live response)
Endpoint detection & response
Live-response shell on the affected host
Host shell session
The affected host
Owner: The system's business owner, named on the asset record
Containing a host you haven't identified can stop revenue. Check criticality and owner before you isolate anything.
You may act alone
Ask a human first
When the console goes dark the workload is usually fine, and the temptation is to reboot things until the picture comes back. The discipline is to repair the management plane in dependency order and to leave the running machines alone while you do it.
A host whose agents have wedged still runs its guests. Rebooting it to fix a console problem takes an outage nobody needed; restarting the agents does not.
Services that stop themselves usually stopped for a reason — most often a full log disk. Start them without clearing the cause and they stop again, and the second failure looks like a different problem.
A certificate issued by a host whose clock is minutes out is rejected as not yet valid. Ordering the repairs by what depends on what saves an hour of confusing errors.
Certificates and licenses lapse silently and take the whole management plane with them. They belong on a calendar, not in an incident.
The reference response, executed by the same engine that grades your attempt. Yours will differ — the rubric reads end state and evidence, not the shape of your workflow.
Gate approved — 100%
16 of 16 rubric rules hold.
Gate denied — 92%
Refusing the consequential action is a defensible choice with a measured cost; the difference is what the lab is teaching.
A management plane that has gone blind is both a common outage and a common cover: full log disks, stopped services, wrong clocks and expired certificates all destroy or invalidate the record of what happened while nobody could see.
| Technique | Name | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1082 | System Information Discovery | Discovery |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion |
| T1070.004 | Indicator Removal: File Deletion | Defense Evasion |
The workflow reached a terminal success state on the graded run.
behavior · weight 20
A reversible action passed through a human approval gate.
safety · weight 15
No non-idempotent operation was retried without an idempotency key.
efficiency · weight 10
Every action node resolves its secret from the vault, never an inline field.
configuration · weight 10
The learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
investigation · weight 10
The case carries an analyst closure note explaining the outcome.
explanation · weight 10
No innocent asset in the alert batch was contained, disabled or revoked.
behavior · weight 15
The playbook survived the integration faults it met and still finished.
configuration · weight 15
Nothing was changed in the estate before evidence had been gathered.
investigation · weight 10
The platform was worked in the console rather than described from the ticket.
investigation · weight 15
The platform was measured before it was touched.
investigation · weight 10 · T1082 System Information Discovery (Discovery)
The unmanaged host was identified without disturbing its running guests.
investigation · weight 10 · T1082 System Information Discovery (Discovery)
The cause of the stopped services was found before they were restarted.
investigation · weight 10 · T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion (Defense Evasion)
An expiry that would have become an outage was caught in time.
investigation · weight 10 · T1078 Valid Accounts (Defense Evasion)
Repairs were sequenced by what depends on what, not by what was noticed first.
investigation · weight 10 · T1078 Valid Accounts (Defense Evasion)
The management plane was repaired and the result measured.
configuration · weight 15 · T1078 Valid Accounts (Defense Evasion)
Vocabulary is generated from the teaching profiles, so it always matches what the consoles render.
| Concept | Cortex Forge | Summit SOAR | Storyline |
|---|---|---|---|
| case | Incident | Container | Case |
| alert | Alert | Event | Event |
| artifact | Indicator | Artifact | Record |
| workflow | Playbook | Playbook | Story |
| workflow-run | Playbook run | Playbook debug run | Story run |
| node | Task | Block | Action |
| connector | Integration | App | Credential-backed action |
| connector-instance | Integration instance | Asset | Resource |
| credential | Credential | Asset credential | Credential |
| approval | Manual task | Prompt | Page |
| child-workflow | Sub-playbook | Child playbook | Sub-story |
| context-path | Context path | Datapath | Event path |
| queue | Incidents | Events | Cases |
| task | Work Plan task | Task | Case task |
| note | War Room entry | Note | Case note |
The same reference to an enrichment node's verdict, written three ways:
The consoles you practice in use teaching names. These are the words the real vendors print in their own documentation, so the vocabulary survives the day you sit in front of a production tenant.
| Concept | Cortex XSOARXSOAR 8.x | Splunk SOARSplunk SOAR 6.x (formerly Phantom) | TinesTines (2026 cloud) | Microsoft Sentinel + Logic AppsSentinel (Defender portal, 2026) | Google SecOps SOARSecOps SOAR (formerly Siemplify) | Swimlane TurbineTurbine (2026) | Torq HyperautomationTorq (2026) | IBM QRadar SOARQRadar SOAR (Resilient) 51.x | ServiceNow Security OperationsSecOps (Flow Designer era) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| case | Incident | Container | Case | Incident | Case | Record | Case | Incident | Security incident (SIR) |
| alert | Alert | Event | Event | Alert | Alert | Inbound record / signal | Trigger event | Escalated offense / alert | Security alert |
| artifact | Indicator | Artifact (CEF fields) | Event payload field | Entity | Entity | Field / correlation value | Event field | Artifact | Observable |
| workflow | Playbook | Playbook | Story | Playbook (Logic App) | Playbook | Playbook | Workflow | Workflow (BPMN) | Flow / subflow |
| workflow-run | Playbook run | Playbook run / debug run | Event flow | Logic App run | Playbook execution | Playbook execution | Execution | Workflow execution | Flow execution |
| node | Task | Block | Action | Action / step | Action / step | Action | Step | Function / script | Flow action |
| connector | Integration | App | HTTP Request action / Tool | Connector | Integration | Integration | Integration | App | Spoke |
| connector-instance | Integration instance | Asset | Credential + resource pair | API connection | Integration instance (environment-scoped) | Asset | Integration connection | App configuration (app.config) | Connection & credential alias |
| credential | Credential | Asset configuration secret | Credential | Managed identity / connection secret | Integration parameter (secret) | Vault secret | Secret | App host secret | Credential record |
| approval | Manual (data collection) task | Prompt block | Page (form) / Send to Chat | Approval action (Teams / email) | Manual action | Task / approval action | Approval step (Torq Chat / Slack) | Manual task / phase gate | Approval activity |
| child-workflow | Sub-playbook | Child playbook | Send to Story | Nested Logic App | Block | Sub-playbook | Nested workflow | Called workflow | Subflow |
| context-path | Context path (${...}) | Datapath | Formula (<<path.to.value>>) | Expression (@{body('step')}) | Placeholder ([Entity.Identifier]) | Reference ($record.field) | Expression ({{ .event.field }}) | Rule/script object (incident.properties) | Data pill |
| queue | Incidents view | Event / Case list | Cases | Incidents grid | Cases queue | Application workspace | Cases | Incident list | SIR queue |
| task | Work Plan task | Task (workbook phase) | Case task | Incident task | Task | Task | Case task | Task (within phase) | Response task |
| note | War Room entry | Note | Case note | Comment | Case wall comment | Comment | Case comment | Note | Work note |
Repair in dependency order, least disruptive action first, is the general shape of every control-plane incident.