Cybrary ForgeCYBRARY / FORGE
Curriculum
C-358·Cross-platform·40 min

Someone else's memory Start this lab

A program wrote code into a trusted Windows process and let that process do the work, so the network connections belong to something nobody would question. Name what was injected, judge it against the endpoint sensor that reads memory legitimately, and isolate the machine.

Mission brief · C-358

Tier 3 analyst on the incident response bench

Tier 3 — deep host and forensics
Business important
Track default

You are acting as

the break-glass IR account `svc-ir`, checked out of the vault for this incident — never the compromised identity

How you got here

The detection fired in the EDR console. You opened a live-response session from that detection, so your shell rides the EDR agent channel — containing the host will *not* cut you off, which is exactly why you contain from here rather than over SSH.

Your access

  • EDR console (detections + live response)

    Endpoint detection & response

    • Read the detection and process tree
    • Look up host criticality, owner and VIP flags
    • Open a live-response session on the host
    • Contain the host over the agent channel
    • Not yours: Disable user accounts (that's the identity team)
    • Not yours: Delete evidence
  • Live-response shell on the affected host

    Host shell session

    • Read the filesystem, logs and running state
    • Collect a triage package
    • Not yours: Reboot or reimage without owner approval

What's at stake

The affected host

Owner: The system's business owner, named on the asset record

Containing a host you haven't identified can stop revenue. Check criticality and owner before you isolate anything.

Rules of engagement

You may act alone

  • Investigate from the live-response session
  • Collect evidence and triage packages
  • Contain a standard-criticality host

Ask a human first

  • Containing a mission-critical host — asset owner and on-call manager first
  • Disabling a user identity — identity team, and HR/legal if it looks like an insider

Why this matters

Injection breaks the assumption that a process's behavior belongs to its own code, so process names stop being evidence.

Concepts

The victim is not the finding

The trusted process is borrowed; the module written into it is the artifact to chase.

Legitimate memory access exists

Security agents and debuggers read other processes all day — who did the writing matters more than that writing happened.

Contain the machine, not the process

Killing the host process loses the evidence and leaves whatever re-injects it running.

Objectives graded

  • Name the module that was written into the trusted process
  • Tell attacker memory access apart from the endpoint sensor's own
  • Isolate the machine rather than killing the host process

Incident timeline

Relative to the moment the alert fired. One of these beats is ordinary activity.

  1. −22mAn unsigned program starts from a program-data folderEDRT1204.002
  2. −20mThe endpoint sensor reads several processes as part of its scanEDRordinary activity
  3. −14mMemory is written into a trusted process and a thread starts thereEDRT1055.001
  4. alertThe trusted process opens an outbound session it has never opened beforeProxyT1071.001
  5. +11mThe launching program deletes itself and leaves the thread runningEDRT1070.004

Live walkthrough

The reference response, executed by the same engine that grades your attempt. Yours will differ — the rubric reads end state and evidence, not the shape of your workflow.

  1. 1.Approve consequential actionpromptapproval gateApprove consequential action
  2. 2.Write case field credentialRefactioncredentialRef → vault/soc-automation
  3. 3.Attach evidence: case/soar-c-358/evidenceactionThe learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
  4. 4.Write case field closureNoteactionclosureNote → written
  5. 5.Write case field injectedModuleactioninjectedModule → C:\ProgramData\Intel\drvsvc.dll
  6. 6.verdict on ind-inject-dllactionind-inject-dll.verdict → malicious
  7. 7.isolated on hst-nw-wks37actionapproval gatehst-nw-wks37.isolated → true

Gate approved — 100%

12 of 12 rubric rules hold.

Gate denied — 79%

Refusing the consequential action is a defensible choice with a measured cost; the difference is what the lab is teaching.

  • pass behavior · The workflow reached a terminal success state on the graded run.
  • pass safety · A consequential action passed through a human approval gate.
  • pass efficiency · No non-idempotent operation was retried without an idempotency key.
  • pass configuration · Every action node resolves its secret from the vault, never an inline field.
  • pass investigation · The learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
  • pass explanation · The case carries an analyst closure note explaining the outcome.
  • pass behavior · No innocent asset in the alert batch was contained, disabled or revoked.
  • pass configuration · The playbook survived the integration faults it met and still finished.
  • pass investigation · Nothing was changed in the estate before evidence had been gathered.
  • pass investigation · The learner named the injected module rather than the host process it landed in.
  • pass investigation · Memory access by the attacker was told apart from the sensor's own scanning.
  • pass behavior · The machine was isolated while the injected thread was still running.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Code written into a trusted process, so the outbound session belongs to something nobody questions.

TechniqueNameTactic
T1055.001Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library InjectionDefense Evasion
T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsCommand and Control
T1070.004Indicator Removal: File DeletionDefense Evasion

What each rubric rule proves

  • The workflow reached a terminal success state on the graded run.

    behavior · weight 20

  • A consequential action passed through a human approval gate.

    safety · weight 15

  • No non-idempotent operation was retried without an idempotency key.

    efficiency · weight 10

  • Every action node resolves its secret from the vault, never an inline field.

    configuration · weight 10

  • The learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.

    investigation · weight 10

  • The case carries an analyst closure note explaining the outcome.

    explanation · weight 10

  • No innocent asset in the alert batch was contained, disabled or revoked.

    behavior · weight 15

  • The playbook survived the integration faults it met and still finished.

    configuration · weight 15

  • Nothing was changed in the estate before evidence had been gathered.

    investigation · weight 10

  • The learner named the injected module rather than the host process it landed in.

    investigation · weight 20 · T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection (Defense Evasion)

  • Memory access by the attacker was told apart from the sensor's own scanning.

    investigation · weight 15 · T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion (Defense Evasion)

  • The machine was isolated while the injected thread was still running.

    behavior · weight 20 · T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (Command and Control)

Common mistakes

  • Blocking the signed system binary the code was injected into.
  • Treating the deletion of the launcher as the end of the intrusion.

Same idea, three vendors

Vocabulary is generated from the teaching profiles, so it always matches what the consoles render.

ConceptCortex ForgeSummit SOARStoryline
caseIncidentContainerCase
alertAlertEventEvent
artifactIndicatorArtifactRecord
workflowPlaybookPlaybookStory
workflow-runPlaybook runPlaybook debug runStory run
nodeTaskBlockAction
connectorIntegrationAppCredential-backed action
connector-instanceIntegration instanceAssetResource
credentialCredentialAsset credentialCredential
approvalManual taskPromptPage
child-workflowSub-playbookChild playbookSub-story
context-pathContext pathDatapathEvent path
queueIncidentsEventsCases
taskWork Plan taskTaskCase task
noteWar Room entryNoteCase note

Where does this value come from?

The same reference to an enrichment node's verdict, written three ways:

  • Cortex Forge: ${enrich-sender.verdict}
  • Summit SOAR: enrich-sender.verdict
  • Storyline: <<enrich-sender.verdict>>

The same concepts in shipping products

The consoles you practice in use teaching names. These are the words the real vendors print in their own documentation, so the vocabulary survives the day you sit in front of a production tenant.

ConceptCortex XSOARXSOAR 8.xSplunk SOARSplunk SOAR 6.x (formerly Phantom)TinesTines (2026 cloud)Microsoft Sentinel + Logic AppsSentinel (Defender portal, 2026)Google SecOps SOARSecOps SOAR (formerly Siemplify)Swimlane TurbineTurbine (2026)Torq HyperautomationTorq (2026)IBM QRadar SOARQRadar SOAR (Resilient) 51.xServiceNow Security OperationsSecOps (Flow Designer era)
caseIncidentContainerCaseIncidentCaseRecordCaseIncidentSecurity incident (SIR)
alertAlertEventEventAlertAlertInbound record / signalTrigger eventEscalated offense / alertSecurity alert
artifactIndicatorArtifact (CEF fields)Event payload fieldEntityEntityField / correlation valueEvent fieldArtifactObservable
workflowPlaybookPlaybookStoryPlaybook (Logic App)PlaybookPlaybookWorkflowWorkflow (BPMN)Flow / subflow
workflow-runPlaybook runPlaybook run / debug runEvent flowLogic App runPlaybook executionPlaybook executionExecutionWorkflow executionFlow execution
nodeTaskBlockActionAction / stepAction / stepActionStepFunction / scriptFlow action
connectorIntegrationAppHTTP Request action / ToolConnectorIntegrationIntegrationIntegrationAppSpoke
connector-instanceIntegration instanceAssetCredential + resource pairAPI connectionIntegration instance (environment-scoped)AssetIntegration connectionApp configuration (app.config)Connection & credential alias
credentialCredentialAsset configuration secretCredentialManaged identity / connection secretIntegration parameter (secret)Vault secretSecretApp host secretCredential record
approvalManual (data collection) taskPrompt blockPage (form) / Send to ChatApproval action (Teams / email)Manual actionTask / approval actionApproval step (Torq Chat / Slack)Manual task / phase gateApproval activity
child-workflowSub-playbookChild playbookSend to StoryNested Logic AppBlockSub-playbookNested workflowCalled workflowSubflow
context-pathContext path (${...})DatapathFormula (<<path.to.value>>)Expression (@{body('step')})Placeholder ([Entity.Identifier])Reference ($record.field)Expression ({{ .event.field }})Rule/script object (incident.properties)Data pill
queueIncidents viewEvent / Case listCasesIncidents gridCases queueApplication workspaceCasesIncident listSIR queue
taskWork Plan taskTask (workbook phase)Case taskIncident taskTaskTaskCase taskTask (within phase)Response task
noteWar Room entryNoteCase noteCommentCase wall commentCommentCase commentNoteWork note

What transfers

Hollowed processes, reflective loading and library hijacking all present the same way to the analyst.