Cybrary ForgeCYBRARY / FORGE
Curriculum
C-344·Cross-platform·40 min

The share read end to end Start this lab

One account walks an entire finance share in twenty minutes — the volume, not the permission, is the finding. Quantify what was read, adjudicate the path, and remove the account's reach behind an approval gate while the nightly backup job keeps running.

Mission brief · C-344

Tier 3 analyst on the incident response bench

Tier 3 — deep host and forensics
Business important
Track default

You are acting as

the break-glass IR account `svc-ir`, checked out of the vault for this incident — never the compromised identity

How you got here

The detection fired in the EDR console. You opened a live-response session from that detection, so your shell rides the EDR agent channel — containing the host will *not* cut you off, which is exactly why you contain from here rather than over SSH.

Your access

  • EDR console (detections + live response)

    Endpoint detection & response

    • Read the detection and process tree
    • Look up host criticality, owner and VIP flags
    • Open a live-response session on the host
    • Contain the host over the agent channel
    • Not yours: Disable user accounts (that's the identity team)
    • Not yours: Delete evidence
  • Live-response shell on the affected host

    Host shell session

    • Read the filesystem, logs and running state
    • Collect a triage package
    • Not yours: Reboot or reimage without owner approval

What's at stake

The affected host

Owner: The system's business owner, named on the asset record

Containing a host you haven't identified can stop revenue. Check criticality and owner before you isolate anything.

Rules of engagement

You may act alone

  • Investigate from the live-response session
  • Collect evidence and triage packages
  • Contain a standard-criticality host

Ask a human first

  • Containing a mission-critical host — asset owner and on-call manager first
  • Disabling a user identity — identity team, and HR/legal if it looks like an insider

Why this matters

Collection is the step where a breach becomes a data-loss event. What the regulator, the customer and the insurer all want is the same number: what was read. That number is produced here, not later.

Concepts

Measure the read

A full-tree read in twenty minutes is not how a person uses a share. Aggregate the file-read events by share and by account; the rate and the completeness are the evidence.

Classification decides urgency

The same read volume against a public share and a finance share are different incidents. Enrich the path against the data classification before you escalate.

Revoke without breaking the night

Service accounts read shares for legitimate reasons too. Remove the account from the share access list, then verify both that the reads stop and that the backup job still completes.

Objectives graded

  • Measure the read rather than arguing about the permission
  • Check the share path against its data classification
  • Revoke access behind an approval gate without stopping the backup job

Live walkthrough

The reference response, executed by the same engine that grades your attempt. Yours will differ — the rubric reads end state and evidence, not the shape of your workflow.

  1. 1.Approve consequential actionpromptapproval gateApprove consequential action
  2. 2.Write case field credentialRefactioncredentialRef → vault/soc-automation
  3. 3.Attach evidence: case/soar-c-344/evidenceactionThe learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
  4. 4.Write case field closureNoteactionclosureNote → written
  5. 5.Write case field readShareactionreadShare → Finance
  6. 6.verdict on ind-share-pathactionind-share-path.verdict → malicious
  7. 7.shareAccessRevoked on usr-svc-backupopsactionapproval gateusr-svc-backupops.shareAccessRevoked → true

Gate approved — 100%

12 of 12 rubric rules hold.

Gate denied — 79%

Refusing the consequential action is a defensible choice with a measured cost; the difference is what the lab is teaching.

  • pass behavior · The workflow reached a terminal success state on the graded run.
  • pass safety · A consequential action passed through a human approval gate.
  • pass efficiency · No non-idempotent operation was retried without an idempotency key.
  • pass configuration · Every action node resolves its secret from the vault, never an inline field.
  • pass investigation · The learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
  • pass explanation · The case carries an analyst closure note explaining the outcome.
  • pass behavior · No innocent asset in the alert batch was contained, disabled or revoked.
  • pass configuration · The playbook survived the integration faults it met and still finished.
  • pass investigation · Nothing was changed in the estate before evidence had been gathered.
  • pass investigation · The learner filed the share that was read end to end.
  • pass investigation · The share path was judged before access was pulled.
  • pass behavior · The account's access to the share was revoked, not merely logged.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

One account walks an entire file share end to end — collection from a network shared drive.

TechniqueNameTactic
T1039Data from Network Shared DriveCollection
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain AccountsDefense Evasion

What each rubric rule proves

  • The workflow reached a terminal success state on the graded run.

    behavior · weight 20

  • A consequential action passed through a human approval gate.

    safety · weight 15

  • No non-idempotent operation was retried without an idempotency key.

    efficiency · weight 10

  • Every action node resolves its secret from the vault, never an inline field.

    configuration · weight 10

  • The learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.

    investigation · weight 10

  • The case carries an analyst closure note explaining the outcome.

    explanation · weight 10

  • No innocent asset in the alert batch was contained, disabled or revoked.

    behavior · weight 15

  • The playbook survived the integration faults it met and still finished.

    configuration · weight 15

  • Nothing was changed in the estate before evidence had been gathered.

    investigation · weight 10

  • The learner filed the share that was read end to end.

    investigation · weight 20 · T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive (Collection)

  • The share path was judged before access was pulled.

    investigation · weight 15 · T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive (Collection)

  • The account's access to the share was revoked, not merely logged.

    behavior · weight 20 · T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (Defense Evasion)

Common mistakes

  • Reporting unauthorized access without a file count or a share name.
  • Disabling the service account and breaking the nightly backup.
  • Assuming a permitted permission means an acceptable read.

Same idea, three vendors

Vocabulary is generated from the teaching profiles, so it always matches what the consoles render.

ConceptCortex ForgeSummit SOARStoryline
approvalManual taskPromptPage

Where does this value come from?

The same reference to an enrichment node's verdict, written three ways:

  • Cortex Forge: ${enrich-sender.verdict}
  • Summit SOAR: enrich-sender.verdict
  • Storyline: <<enrich-sender.verdict>>

The same concepts in shipping products

The consoles you practice in use teaching names. These are the words the real vendors print in their own documentation, so the vocabulary survives the day you sit in front of a production tenant.

ConceptCortex XSOARXSOAR 8.xSplunk SOARSplunk SOAR 6.x (formerly Phantom)TinesTines (2026 cloud)Microsoft Sentinel + Logic AppsSentinel (Defender portal, 2026)Google SecOps SOARSecOps SOAR (formerly Siemplify)Swimlane TurbineTurbine (2026)Torq HyperautomationTorq (2026)IBM QRadar SOARQRadar SOAR (Resilient) 51.xServiceNow Security OperationsSecOps (Flow Designer era)
approvalManual (data collection) taskPrompt blockPage (form) / Send to ChatApproval action (Teams / email)Manual actionTask / approval actionApproval step (Torq Chat / Slack)Manual task / phase gateApproval activity

What transfers

The same measurement discipline sizes cloud bucket reads, SaaS export jobs and database table dumps.