Breach response plan
The same eight steps as the playbook, written the way an organization keeps them: a clock, an owner, the tools that get opened, what is handed on, and the call that gets made. Back to the defender playbook · practice it in the training room.
The plan, step by step
- 01
Watch the wire against the baseline
detectStanding, before anything happensby standingA breach shows up as traffic the estate has never carried before.
- Owner
- soc analyst
- In the room
- network engineer
- Tools
- SIEM saved searches · NDR or flow collector · Asset inventory · Baseline record
- Handed on
- A dated baseline and a drift figure anyone can re-run.
- 02
Confirm it on the packet timeline
verifyFirst 30 minutesby 30 minDrift can be a busy afternoon; the timeline names the account.
- Owner
- soc analyst
- In the room
- incident commander
- Tools
- Packet timeline · EDR process tree · Directory audit log · Ticket system
- Handed on
- A written statement: this account, from this machine, at this timestamp — with the frame or log line quoted.
Page the incident commander and open the incident channel.
- 03
Isolate the machine the attacker holds
containFirst hourby 1 hEvery minute it stays on the network is another machine it can reach.
- Owner
- incident commander
- In the room
- soc analyst, platform owner
- Tools
- EDR network containment · Switch port shutdown · Hypervisor pause · Change record
- Handed on
- A list of contained assets with the time each was cut off.
Tell the platform owner before the machine goes dark, not after.
- 04
Block the account and the route
containFirst hourby 2 hIsolating one machine does nothing if the credentials still work elsewhere.
- Owner
- network engineer
- In the room
- incident commander
- Tools
- Firewall egress rules · DNS sinkhole · Proxy blocklist · Identity conditional access
- Handed on
- Blocked destinations and disabled credentials, with rule ids.
Warn the service desk that logins may fail, with the wording to use.
- 05
Preserve the evidence before you clean up
eradicateFirst 4 hours, before anything is rebuiltby 4 hThe capture is the only record of what actually happened.
- Owner
- forensics
- In the room
- legal and privacy
- Tools
- Disk and memory imaging · Log export with hashes · Evidence register · Case system
- Handed on
- Hashed images and exports, with a signed chain of custody.
Legal decides whether outside counsel and a retained responder are engaged — make the call now, not at day three.
- 06
Close the way in
eradicateDay 1 to day 3by 1 dContainment without a fix just moves the next run a few minutes later.
- Owner
- identity admin
- In the room
- platform owner, forensics
- Tools
- Credential and key rotation · Golden-image rebuild · Persistence sweep across the estate · Patch and configuration management
- Handed on
- Every implanted foothold named, and the rotation record for every exposed secret.
Agree the maintenance window with the business owner in writing.
- 07
Restore the baseline
recoverDay 2 onward, once eradication is provenby 2 dThe estate is only recovered when its traffic looks like itself again.
- Owner
- platform owner
- In the room
- incident commander, soc analyst
- Tools
- Backup restore from a clean recovery point · Integrity checks · Heightened monitoring
- Handed on
- Services back with the recovery point named, and monitoring turned up on them.
Tell the business which services are live and what is still degraded.
- 08
Write it up
reportWithin the regulator's clock, and a debrief inside two weeksby 3 dThe run is worth nothing to the next team if nobody can read it.
- Owner
- legal and privacy
- In the room
- incident commander, communications, executive sponsor
- Tools
- Incident report template · Regulator portal · Customer notice · Lessons log
- Handed on
- The filed notification, the customer notice and a dated list of fixes with owners.
Notify the regulator, insurer and affected customers as the regime requires.
Clocks that start outside the room
These start on awareness or confirmation, not on containment — which is why confirming the breach is the step everything else hangs off. Check the wording for your own jurisdiction and sector before you rely on any of it.
- GDPR (EU/UK)72 hours
Tell: Supervisory authority, then affected people when the risk is high. Clock starts on: Becoming aware of a personal data breach.
Read the source - CIRCIA (US critical infrastructure)72 hours for a covered incident, 24 hours for a ransom payment
Tell: CISA. Clock starts on: Reasonable belief a covered cyber incident has occurred.
Read the source - SEC disclosure (US listed companies)4 business days
Tell: Investors, via an 8-K filing. Clock starts on: Determining the incident is material.
Read the source - NIS2 (EU essential and important entities)24-hour early warning, 72-hour notification, 1-month final report
Tell: National CSIRT or competent authority. Clock starts on: Becoming aware of a significant incident.
Read the source - PCI DSS (card data)Immediately on suspicion
Tell: Acquirer and the card brands. Clock starts on: Suspected compromise of cardholder data.
Read the source