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Forge Workshop

Build detections and automation that actually run, then break them.

What is in it

For detection engineer, automation engineer — ship reliable detections and playbooks, and recover when a connector fails.

  • Executable SOAR playbooks: draft, run, fail, repair, rerun
  • Deterministic integration faults and idempotent retries
  • A run debugger showing resolved inputs, outputs, errors and retries
  • Detection rules tested against positive and benign fixtures

What it is not

  • Playbooks run against the simulated estate, not your production tools
  • Not a commercial SOAR product you would deploy

Forge Workshop against the field

15 capabilities that matter for this purchase, next to the platforms a buyer shortlists in this lane: Immersive, RangeForce, TryHackMe.

  • Playbooks genuinely execute against the estate — draft, run, fail on a staged connector fault, repair, rerun.
  • A run debugger shows resolved inputs, outputs, errors and retries rather than a pass mark.
  • Detections are tested against benign fixtures as well as positives, so a noisy rule fails.
Forge Workshop capability comparison against 3 platforms
What you needForge WorkshopIncluded in the platformTHMRangeForceImmersive
SOC investigation exerciseTryHackMe: Documented for SOC investigation exerciseRangeForce: Documented for SOC investigation exerciseImmersive: Documented for SOC investigation exercise
Alert triage with true and false positive decisionsEvery case ships with innocent lookalikes so closing everything scores badly.TryHackMe: Documented for Alert triage with true and false positive decisionsRangeForce: Limited for Alert triage with true and false positive decisionsImmersive: Limited for Alert triage with true and false positive decisions
SIEM query and investigation practiceTryHackMe: Documented for SIEM query and investigation practiceRangeForce: Documented for SIEM query and investigation practiceImmersive: Documented for SIEM query and investigation practice
Endpoint analysis and accessTryHackMe: Limited for Endpoint analysis and accessRangeForce: Documented for Endpoint analysis and accessImmersive: Limited for Endpoint analysis and access
Threat hunting kept separate from alert triageTryHackMe: Documented for Threat hunting kept separate from alert triageRangeForce: Documented for Threat hunting kept separate from alert triageImmersive: Documented for Threat hunting kept separate from alert triage
Investigation that crosses multiple toolsOne estate behind SIEM, EDR, case service, network devices and the wire.TryHackMe: Documented for Investigation that crosses multiple toolsRangeForce: Documented for Investigation that crosses multiple toolsImmersive: Documented for Investigation that crosses multiple tools
Analyst report or evidence submissionTryHackMe: Documented for Analyst report or evidence submissionRangeForce: Documented for Analyst report or evidence submissionImmersive: Documented for Analyst report or evidence submission
Measured investigation and response timingDwell time, containment time and SLA clocks are scored, not just recorded.TryHackMe: Documented for Measured investigation and response timingRangeForce: Documented for Measured investigation and response timingImmersive: Documented for Measured investigation and response timing
Detection-engineering curriculumTryHackMe: Documented for Detection-engineering curriculumRangeForce: Documented for Detection-engineering curriculumImmersive: Documented for Detection-engineering curriculum
SOAR concepts and workflow trainingTryHackMe: Limited for SOAR concepts and workflow trainingRangeForce: Limited for SOAR concepts and workflow trainingImmersive: Documented for SOAR concepts and workflow training
Learner authors an executable SOAR playbookDeliberately stricter than the row above: a SOAR-looking screen is not a runtime.Draft, run, fail, repair and rerun against the live estate, with an audit trail.Immersive: Documented for Learner authors an executable SOAR playbook
Connector failure and replay debugger for automationDeterministic integration faults with idempotent retries. Not established for any vendor in the research.
Configuration changes alter the exerciseFirewall, routing and policy edits change what the wire and the SIEM then show.TryHackMe: Limited for Configuration changes alter the exerciseRangeForce: Documented for Configuration changes alter the exerciseImmersive: Documented for Configuration changes alter the exercise
Rogue access point owned by the estate, not scripted
Each scenario carries its own SIEM, alerts and case databaseNo shared global console: an alert raises a case on the estate it came from, and cannot leak into another team's exercise.TryHackMe: Limited for Each scenario carries its own SIEM, alerts and case database

The run behind this line: Write the search that catches the persistence

A detection-engineering bench: the persistence is already planted, and the deliverable is a search that finds it without drowning in noise.

Opponent: Quiet operator relying on names that look like real software. Shaped after Persistence tradecraft documented across ATT&CK T1547, T1543 and T1053. Technique and zone identifiers are published by MITRE and ISA/IEC; the mapping is ours and is not an accreditation.

How it starts — the message delivered to the mailbox

From
Microsoft 365 Message Center <messagecenter@m365-notices.example>
Subject
Action required: OneDrive sync client update for your device
Attachment
OneDriveSyncUpdate.lnk (Windows shortcut)
  • A shortcut file posing as an updater
  • A vendor notice sent from a domain the vendor does not own
  • The get-out clause at the end, added so the reader does not ask IT

Graded verdict: phish — T1566.001. Nothing here sends or resolves anywhere real.

The steps, and the zone each one crosses

#TacticATT&CKOn the rangeIEC 62443 zone
1Initial accessT1566.001 Phishing: spearphishing attachmentThe shortcut runs the loader and writes it to ProgramData.Enterprise
2PersistenceT1547.001 Registry Run keyA Run value named OneDriveSync points at C:\ProgramData\rt.exe.Enterprise
3PersistenceT1543.003 Windows serviceA service called WinTelemetrySvc is installed and started.Enterprise
4PersistenceT1053.005 Scheduled tasktaskeng launches a hidden PowerShell script from ProgramData.Enterprise

Zones in this run: Enterprise (Purdue level 4/5, via Internet mail and web egress); Identity (Purdue level 4, via LDAP and Kerberos to the domain controllers). How the zone model is used.

The alerts the SIEM raises from this run

  • Run key written to a user-writable path

    HKCU Run value whose data points at ProgramData, Temp or AppData.

    endpoint agent · stage 2 · LINE-WORKSHOP-01 · T1547.001

  • Service installed with a suspicious image path

    7045 where the image path is outside Program Files or System32.

    endpoint agent · stage 3 · LINE-WORKSHOP-02 · T1543.003

  • Hidden PowerShell launched by the task engine

    taskeng.exe or svchost as the parent of powershell -w hidden.

    endpoint agent · stage 4 · LINE-WORKSHOP-03 · T1053.005

What the case has to hold before it closes

  • The search that finds all three persistence mechanisms
  • The false-positive rate the search produces against the clean estate
  • The artifact each hit points at
  • The removal steps, in an order that does not destroy the evidence

Start learning this line

Build the detection and the playbook on the bench, compiled by the same engine the graded cases run.

Start the labThen run the campaign

A tick means the other platform's own documentation shows it. A question mark means we could not confirm it publicly — it is never a claim that they lack it. Every Forge yes opens the working screen rather than a screenshot.